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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
COURT'S POWER TO TAX COSTS FOR VEXATIOUS REFUSAL TO
MAKE ADMISSIONS HELD CONSTITUTIONAL.-The power of the
courts to tax costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, for the
vexatious and unreasonable refusal to make certain admissions as

provided by the Civil Practice Act' has been held constitutional
and a valid exercise of judicial and legislative powers in the
recent case of Wintersteen
v. The National Cooperage and Wood2
enware Company.
In the course of the case, sounding in tort, it became material
to introduce certain rules and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Plaintiff exhibited to the defendant a copy
of the rules of the commission and demanded an admission that
they were in force and effect and covered the matter in controversy, pursuant to the statute. 8 Defendant refused to 'make the
admission. On the trial, plaintiff introduced a certified copy of
the Interstate Commerce Commission rules.
After judgment, on motion duly made to tax the costs of pro1 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 110, par. 232, Supreme Court Rule 18.

2 361 Ill. 95, 197 N. E. 578 (1935).
3 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 110, par. 232, Supreme Court Rule 18.
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curing said copy, the court allowed $11.20, the amount expended
for the certified copy and, in addition, $100 as attorneys' fees
and taxed the total as costs in the case.
Defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Court on the
constitutional question, attacking the statute and rules on two
grounds: (1) That the statute is an attempted delegation of
legislative power to the Supreme Court; and (2) that the statute
and the rule of court are invalid because they violate the provisions of the state constitution prohibiting class legislation.'
Mr. Justice Herrick, in a dissenting opinion, presents the
arguments of appellants. On the first point, he states the wellsettled rule that since costs were not recoverable at common law,5
there must be some statutory provision allowing them ;6 that such
statute, being in contravention to the common law, must be
strictly construed;T and that the determination of whether costs
may be recovered is primarily a legislative question.
On this point, the majority opinion admits that the court cannot assess costs unless so empowered by the legislature, s but
declares that such power may be granted in general terms to the
courts, which, in turn, may make rules or orders under which
costs may be taxed and imposed ;9 and that the statute and rules
in the instant case are sufficiently specific to authorize the imposition of costs.
The second point urged by appellants and argued in the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Herrick is perhaps more serious,
for it is claimed that the new Civil Practice Act does not apply
to all causes equally, in that the statutory actions existing by
virtue of special enactments are not controlled by the Act. 10
In support of this contention, the case of Manowsky v.
Stephan1" is cited. This was an action to foreclose a mechanic's
lien under the then existing statute which provided that attorneys' fees should be included as part of the costs. The Supreme
Court in that case held that this was special legislation, saying:
"It confers a right upon persons entitled to liens by virtue of
the Mechanic's Lien law and confers that right upon no others.

4 Art. IV, sec. 22.

5 Patterson v. Northern Trust Co., 286 I1. 564, 122 N. E. 55 (1919).
6 Tid; Goudy v. Mayberry, 272 Ill. 54, 111 N. E. 526 (1916).

7 Gehrke v. Gehrke, 190 Ill.
166, 60 N. E. 59 (1901).
8 Wilson v. Clayburgh, 215 I1. 506, 74 N. E. 799 (1905).
9 15 C. J. 23.
10 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 110, par. 129.
11 233 Ill. 409, 84 N. E. 365 (1908).
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No reason exists for singling out those holding mechanics' liens
and granting unto them this right, while denying it to other
lienholders, such as landlords, agistors, and carriers. Legislation
is not special merely because it applies only to the members of a
particular class, but to make such a law valid there must be some
actual, substantial difference between the individuals of that
class and other persons in the State or community, when considered with reference to the purposes of the legislation. The
class must be composed of individuals possessing in common some
disability, attribute, or qualification, or in some condition marking them as proper objects in whom to vest the specific right
granted unto them."
In the present case, however, the court distinguishes this case
stating that the Civil Practice Act does not amount to special
legislation because it applies to all the special actions mentioned,
except as to such sections of the special statutes as are contrary
to, or in conflict with, the Civil Practice Act.
It is especially interesting to note that since the decision in
this case, the legislature has, by special enactment, amended each
of the special statutes mentioned in the Civil Practice Act as being exempt from its operation, to make the rules of practice and
procedure under the Practice Act applicable to the special actions as well. 12 Thus, the teeth have been wholly extracted from
this argument.
That the decision is fair, in accord with liberal ideas and ideals
of practice, and conducive to the carrying out of the Practice
Act in the spirit in which it was intended, seems indisputable.
J. E. BRUNSWICK
PENDENCY OF PRIOR SUIT WHERE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION Is

LACKING AS GROUND FOR ABATEMENT.-In the recent case of

Leonard v. Bye' the Illinois Supreme Court held that where a
representative suit to enforce double liability has been brought
by one party, the same may be pleaded in abatement to a subsequent suit by another party against the same defendant predicated upon such liability, even though the first court had not
jurisdiction in equity to entertain the first suit.
12 Attachment: Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 11, par. 26; Ejectment:
Ibid., Ch. 45, par. 50; Forcible Entry and Detainer: Ibid., Ch. 57, par. 11;
Garnishment: Ibid., Ch. 62, par. 28; Habeas Corpus: Ibid., Ch. 65, par. 32;
Mandamus: Ibid., Ch. 87, par. 11; Ne Exeat: Ibid., Ch. 97, par. 12; Replevin: Ibid., Ch. 119, par. 21(1).

1 197 N. E. 546 (1935).

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

The court cites no Illinois case in support of the general proposition, but does cite sustaining cases from Alabama 2 and
Georgia.8
In reaching its decision, the court lays down the proposition
that parties purporting to be represented in a properly brought
representative suit are actually bound by the results in the case
until the decree rendered therein is
reversed on appeal, and sup4
ports the same with Illinois cases.
The court then distinguishes between jurisdiction in the strict
sense and in the broader sense, pointing out that, of course, if
the court hearing the first suit is without jurisdiction in the
strict sense, the first suit is a nullity and no bar to a subsequent
suit. The court quotes from Miller v. Rowan5 as follows: "While
jurisdiction in its proper sense means authority to hear and decide a cause, it is common to speak of jurisdiction in equity or
the jurisdiction of a court of equity as not relating to the power
of the court to hear and determine a cause, but as to whether
it ought to assume the jurisdiction and hear and decide the
cause. "
The contention of the present appellant is that "the suit
pleaded in abatement of the present action will not lie under
general equity jurisdiction or under the 1929 amendment (Laws
1929, p. 174) to section 11 of the banking act (Smith-Hurd Ill.
Rev. Stat. [1931], Ch. 1612, par. 11), which purports to authorize such a proceeding," upon the basis that such statutory provision is unconstitutional, as in violation of due process. The
court disposes of this argument by reference to the distinction
noted above between jurisdiction in the strict and broader sense,
deciding that equity has jurisdiction, in the broader sense, of
the present controversy.
Two Illinois cases, one in the Supreme and one in the Appellate Court, are of especial interest in this connection. In the
first of these, Phillips v. Quick,6 the Supreme Court held that a
second suit was not barred where in the first suit a justice of
the peace had rendered judgment for $300.09 upon a $300 demand, when the jurisdiction of such justice was limited strictly
Foster v. Napier, 73 Ala. 595 (1883).
8 Wilson v. Atlanta, K. & N. Ry. Co., 115 Ga. 171, 41 S. E. 699 (1902).
4 Greenberg v. City of Chicago, 256 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 1039, 49 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 108 (1912) ; Harmon v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 123 Ill. 122,
13 N. E. 161, 5 Am. St. Rep. 502 (1887).
5 251 Ill. 344, 96 N. E. 285 (1911).
6 68 Ill. 324 (1873).
2
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by statute to $100.00. The court found that the justice of the
peace was entirely without jurisdiction in the strict sense of the
word, and that therefore the entire suit was a nullity.
The other case, O'Malia v: Glynn,7 is perhaps contrary to the
general rule. In that case the Appellate Court held that a suit
of forcible entry and detainer, begun without the requisite statutory demand, would not bar a subsequent suit, brought while the
first was still pending on appeal. The decision is brief and does
not state definitely whether it regards the statutory demand as
jurisdictional in the strict sense of the word, or as merely a condition precedent to the accrual of the action-if the former, the
decision is sound; if the latter, it would appear that it represents
a departure from the general doctrine.
It must be remembered, of course, that the rule goes no further
than holding that the former action may be pleaded in abatement of the latter, and not actually pleaded in bar.

G. S.

STANSELL

RECOVERY IN QUASI-CONTRACT FOR GRATUITOUS SERVICES RENDERED UNDER MISTAKE OF FACT.-In In re Marine Trust Com-

pany," decided in 1935, the Supreme Court of New York held
that where the claimant had voluntarily contributed to an incompetent priest's support from a fund maintained by an archdiocese, recovery would be allowed on the theory of a quasi or
constructive contract, where the benefit was conferred in ignorance of the fact that the incompetent priest had equitable title to
a savings fund. This decision follows a previous New York decision of In re Agnew's WjiIl,2 which allowed two doctors to
recover in quasi-contract for the value of services performed in
operating on one whom they mistakenly believed to be poor,
their intention at the time being that the services should be
gratuitous. There the court said that notwithstanding the mutual
understanding of the parties that the services were to be gratuitous, in equity and good conscience recompense should be made.
This earlier New York decision has been the subject of comment
in at least two law reviews.3
The cases are of interest when it is noted that despite a gratuitous intent, recovery was allowed. There are many decisions, in7 42 Ill. App. 51 (1891).
1 281 N. Y. S. 553 (1935).
2 230 N. Y.S.519 (1928).

3 24 Ill. Law Rev. 491; 14 Cornell Law Q. 239.
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eluding some rendered by New York courts, which hold that
4
there can be no recovery for benefits gratuitously conferred.
The only apparent distinction between those cases and the two
just cited lies in the fact that in the latter cases the plaintiff
was induced to confer the gratuitous services by a mistake of
fact. This leads to the further consideration of whether or not
mistake of fact is sufficient basis for making an exception to the
operation of the general principle barring recovery in such cases.
The courts of Kentucky and Iowa have refused to introduce
an exception to the general principle in favor of a plaintiff who
has conferred a gratuity under a mistake of fact. In St. Joseph's
OrphanSociety v. Wolpert,5 the Kentucky court refused to allow
the plaintiff to recover for services rendered to two orphans
under the mistaken belief that the orphans were without funds,
the court saying: ". . . an executed gift or gratuity cannot be revoked by the donor, no matter what may have been the condition
of the donee ... unless the donation or gratuity were the result
of fraud or mistake in its execution. And there is no reason
why an executed gift of personal property shall not be revoked
that does not sustain the irrevocability of gratuitous labor, care,
board, or education after completion." In Hanrahanv. Baxter,6
the Iowa court arrived at a similar decision.
In an English case, 7 decided in 1904, the court allowed recovery where the guardians of the poor cared for an infant pauper
for six years and the infant then received a bequest. The court
based its decision on the infant's common law liability. In a
Massachusetts case, 8 the court refused to allow recovery on similar facts.
Cases in which the principles of quasi-contract have been invoked to provide relief from mistake of fact, give a clear conception of the action fulfilling the purpose for which it was intended
-"to meet the justice of the particular case." 9 In the case of
4 City of Albany v. McNamara, 117 N. Y. 168, 22 N. E. 931 (1889);
Oneida County v. Bartholomew, 31 N. Y. S. 106 (1894); Hathaway v.
Delaware County, 93 N. Y. S. 436 (1905) ; Evans v. Henry, 66 Ill.
App.
144 (1895); Smith v. Sisters of Good Shepherd, 29 Ky. L. R. 912, 96 S.W.
549 (1906); Columbus, H. V. & T. Ry. Co. v. Gaffney, 65 Ohio St. 104, 61
N. E. 152 (1901); Strother v. DeWitt, 98 Mo. App. 293, 71 S. W. 1129

(1903).

5 80 Ky. 86, 3 Ky. L. R. 573 (1882).

6 116 N. W. (Iowa) 595, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1046 (1908).
7 In re Clabbon, 2 Ch.465, 467 (1904).
8 Stow v. Sawyer, 85 Mass. 515 (1862).
9 Sinclair v. Brougham, L. R. [1914] A. C. 398 (House of Lords).
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Kelly v. Solari,'° in which the plaintiff, an insurance company
director, was allowed to recover money paid to the defendant
under a mistaken belief that a policy of insurance had not lapsed,
when in fact it had, Baron Parke said: ". . . where money is paid
to another under the influence of a mistake, that is, upon the supposition that a specific fact is true, which would entitle the
other to the money, but which fact is untrue, and the money
would not have been paid if it had been known to the payer that
the fact was untrue, an action will lie to recover it back, and it is
against conscience to retain it ... ." The Maryland court,11 in
allowing recovery of an overpayment made through mistake of
fact, met the defense that the overpayment was made voluntarily
by this significant language:
"A payment cannot well be said to be made voluntarily when
it is made in consequence alone of a false view of facts. The
assent is only induced by the conviction then prevailing in the
mind, that the particular fact existed, and is scarcely to be distinguished from an assent or agreement to pay on condition that
the fact did not exist. The subsequent discovery of the error
destroys the whole basis of the agreement, and the parties are
restored to their original condition and rights." This passage
will support the statement that mistake of fact inducing an act
nullifies the voluntary character of the act as a defense to an
action based on quasi-contract.
Another class of cases wherein the theory of quasi-contract is
invoked as a basis of recovery is that in which through the fraud
of the defendant the plaintiff is induced to confer a benefit on
the defendant. This principle is illustrated by those cases in
which the courts have allowed a woman to recover the value of
her services from a man who induced her to marry him by
fraudulent representations that he was legally free to marry.
In one of these cases, the Wisconsin court stated its position
thus: "The doctrine of assumpsit is applied. It is inferred from
the nature of the transaction, and the supposed husband is held
to have assumed to pay because in point of law and equity it is
just that he should pay. '12 The court refused to follow a line of
10 9 M. & W. 54, 152 Eng. Rep. 24 (1841).

11 Baltimore and Susquehanna R. Co. v. Faunce, 6 Gill (Md.) 52, 46 Am.
Dec. 655 (1847).
12 In re Fox's Estate, 178 Wis. 369, 190 N. W. 90, 31 A. L. R. 420 (1922);
Fox v. Dawson, 6 Martin's Rep. (La.) 94 (1820); Higgins v. Breen, 9 Mo.
497 (1845) ; Sanders v. Ragan, 172 N. C. 612, 90 S. E. 777, L.R. A. 1917B
681 (1916'.
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Massachusetts decisions which hold that the fact that the woman
and man lived together negatived any implication of a promise
to pay by the husband or an intention to be paid on the part of
the wife. 13
From these cases involving fraud and mistake of fact it is
evident that the mental state of the parties at the time of conferring the benefit is not always the determining fact. Despite
the intent to confer a benefit without expectation of remuneration, recovery is allowed because the law and equity of the case
demand it. The promise to pay is implied in law despite the
intent of the parties, not because of it. Applying the logic underlying the decisions in those cases to the case of a gratuity
conferred under a mistake of fact, the same conclusion may be
arrived at as that which the New York court reached in the
principal case. Also, it would seem that this conclusion is in line
of quasi-contract-an obligation arising
with the general nature
14
ex aequo et bono.
The practical result of the doctrine as applied by the New
York courts in the two cases works no hardship on the person
to be charged. The estate of the person who received the service
was benefited (the benefits rendered in both cases being necessaries), the plaintiff was an appropriate intervener, and there
was no change of position on the part of the person to be charged.
The doctrine involved, although but scantily fortified by precedent, commends itself to reason as harmonious with general
principles of equity.
J. M. COUGHLAN
EXAMINATION OF ADVERSE PARTY UNDER CIVIL PRACTICE ACT.-

In Combs, Administrator v. Younge,' the Illinois Appellate2
Court recently construed section 60 of the Civil3 Practice Act,4
which supplants section 6 of the Evidence Act, now repealed.
Section 1 of the Evidence Act,5 still in force, provides that no
13 Robbins v. Potter, 93 Mass. 588 (1866) ; Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass.
370, 17 N. E. 892 (1888) ; Ogden v. McHugh, 167 Mass. 276, 45 N. E. 731

(1897).

14 Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Shut & Keihn, 192 Ala. 53, 68 So. 363
(1915).
1 281 Ill. App. 339 (1935).
2 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 110, par. 184.
8 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1931), Ch. 51, par. 6.

4 Smith-Hurd, op. cit., Ch. 110, par. 218.
5

Ibid., Ch. 51, par. 1.
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person is disqualified as a witness in a civil action because of
interest. Section 2 of the Evidence Act,6 also still in force, contains an exception: "No party to any civil action . . . shall be
allowed to testify therein of his own motion... when any adverse
party sues ... as the administrator of any deceased person ...
unless when called as a witness by such adverse party...."
Section 6 of the same act provided that a party to a civil action
might compel his adversary to testify. The adverse party thus
called became the witness of the party calling him, and was subject to cross-examination by his own attorney. This section was
expressly repealed by section 94, and supplanted by section 60,
of the Civil Practice Act.
Section 60 provides, in general, that any party "may be examined as if under cross-examination at the instance of the
adverse party ...and may be compelled ...to testify. ...."
In the case under discussion, Combs sued as administrator for
his infant son, alleging that defendant had caused the boy's
death by negligently running into him with an automobile.
Plaintiff, as part of his evidence in chief, called the defendant
to the stand. Under the new section he propounded leading questions, as upon cross-examination, and elicited defendant's testimony concerning his own negligence. When defendant attempted
to explain his answers, plaintiff objected. His objections were
sustained.
Defendant's counsel demanded the right to cross-examine his
client. This was denied. The trial court also denied the right
to re-examine him on the matters of negligence brought out by
plaintiff's examination.
The appellate court held that a further cross-examination was
not in order, but that the refusal to allow a re-examination was
error. Its opinion was that "where an administrator sues or
defends a civil action and he calls the opposite party for examination at the trial for cross-examination under section 60 of the
Civil Practice Act, and such party is used as an occurrence
witness by the administrator, such party becomes a competent
witness to testify, on his own behalf as part of his defense, to
all primary and material facts directly determining the issues
in the action. ... "7
The case does not hold that under the new section the calling
of the adverse party by the administrator completely removes
S

Ibid., Ch. 51, par. 2.
281 Ill.
App. 339, 350 (1935).
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the bar against such party set up by section 2 of the Evidence
Act. He still is not competent on all matters. It so happened
that the present administrator called on defendant as an occurrence witness for material touching his own negligence; defendant thus became competent as to all facts relating to his negligence, which was in issue in the action.
It seems that the adverse party may be examined by his own
counsel only within the scope of the cross-examination previously
conducted by counsel for the administrator. This is the way other
courts have interpreted similar statutes in decisions8 cited with
approval by the Illinois court. And this seems the logical way
of harmonizing section 60 of the Practice Act with section 2 of
the Evidence Act, in order to assure both parties a fair trial.
G. E. Fox
SUFFICIENCY OF FACTS, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO CONSTITUTE

ATTRACTIVE NuISANCE.-In Uhls v. Old Ben Coal Corporation,' the Illinois Appellate Court held that it was proper for
the trial court to submit to the jury the question of whether or
not the defendant maintained an attractive nuisance where the
following facts were introduced in evidence. The defendant
maintained a power sub-station in a small building on the south
side of a highway, the side of which, facing the highway, was
not fenced. The door to the building was closed, and the machinery not in operation. The outside equipment included three
transformers, two poles about a foot in diameter, without spikes
or ladder attachments for climbing, two horizontal pipes between
the poles, the lower being sixteen feet from the ground, the
upper, twenty feet, and various wires, insulators, and switches.
The deceased, a boy twelve years of age, was accompanied by
another boy, nine years old. The latter testified that the deceased
climbed on to a fence post a few feet high which was near one
of the poles. From there the deceased "shinnied" up the pole
until he reached the lower horizontal pipe, about a twelve foot
climb. The companion of the deceased testified that he asked the
deceased to go to another place to play, but that the deceased
said it wasn't dangerous and asked the witness to come on up;
that the deceased walked out on the horizontal pipe, touched
AN

8 Jonescu v. Orlich, 208 Mich. 89, 175 N. W. 174 (1919) ; Merritt v.
Hummer, 21 Colo. App. 568, 122 P. 816 (1912) ; Guse v. Power and Mining
Machinery Co., 151 Wis. 400, 139 N. W. 195 (1912).
1 281 Ill. App. 254 (1935).
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an insulator, and was knocked to the ground. The companion
testified that he too tried to climb the pole but could not. There
was no evidence that anyone had ever previously seen children
climbing the poles.
The question of what facts constitute an attractive nuisance
has been before the Illinois courts several times in the past. In
the light of those cases it is interesting to consider whether or
not the court in the present case has shown a tendency to restrict or extend the doctrine. Although the jury ultimately decides whether or not the facts essential to the existence of the
attractive nuisance have been proved, the question of the suffithe
ciency in law of the facts presented may be brought before
2
court by the defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
In The City of Pekin v. McMahon,3 decided in 1895, the Illinois Supreme Court held the question one for the jury where a
child, eight years old, fell into a water-filled pit in a vacant lot
owned by the defendant, the lot being unfenced and there being
a pathway across it.
In Belt Railway Company v. Charter,4 where a child, eleven
years and eight months old, was injured by a turn table, the
court, which reversed and remanded the case because the damages
awarded were excessive, said: "An examination of the 'attractive nuisance' cases will show that in nearly every instance the
child injured was less than ten years of age and incapable of
"
exercising ordinary care ...
In Stollery v. Cicero Street Railway,5 decided in 1910, where a
ten year old child was found wedged in a coal conveyor maintained by the defendant on its property, which was open to the
street on one side, and where the evidence showed that children
were in the habit of entering the premises to reach a water-well
thereon, and that the framework of the conveyor was only three
feet above the ground, the court held the evidence sufficient to
go to the jury, three of the justices dissenting on the ground that
the evidence showed the child to be intelligent and of sufficient
mental capacity to see and avoid danger.
In Stedwell v. City of Chicago,6 decided in 1921, where a child
eleven years old climbed a lattice-work pillar supporting an
2

Burns v. City of Chicago, 338 Ill. 89, 169 N. E. 811 (1930).

3 154
4 123
5 243
6 297

11. 141, 39 N. E. 484 (1895).
Ill. App. 322 (1905).
Ill. 290, 90 N. E. 709 (1910).
Ill. 486, 130 N. E. 729 (1921).
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elevated railway, and thirteen feet above the ground came into
contact with the uninsulated electric wire which caused the injury, the court held the evidence sufficient to go to the jury.
In Deming v. City of Chicago,7 decided in 1926, the court held
that where a boy, nine years old, was electrocuted by coming into
contact with an electric wire which passed within reach of the
trunk of a tree growing in the street, the lower limbs of which
were within six or seven feet of the ground, the question of
attractive nuisance was one for the jury.
In Burns v. City of Chicago,8 decided in 1930, a child climbed
a round steel electric light pole by placing his feet on the foundation collar at the base of the pole, reaching up to a hole in the
pole about four feet above and pulling himself up thereto, then
reached up to the first rung, about ten feet above the ground,
and from there proceeded by rungs to the top. The court held
that the trial court's refusal to direct a verdict for the defendant
was error, on the ground that there was insufficient evidence, as
a matter of law, to prove the essential element of attraction or
allurement. The attitude of the Illinois Supreme Court toward
the application of the doctrine is indicated by this passage from
the opinion: "Counsel for defendant in error suggest that to
deny recovery in this case would be to recede from or modify
a position already taken by this court. The issue presented is
rather whether this court will proceed beyond such position,
which might fairly be said to be well advanced. To say that
whenever the claim is made that an injury to children engaged
in play has been occasioned by a dangerous agency the case must
always be submitted to the jury to determine whether there was
an element of attractiveness present, is going too far."
In Wolczek v. Public Service Company,9 decided in 1931, the
court held that the defendant's motion for a directed verdict was
properly refused where a child eleven years of age was injured
by coming into contact with a wire suspended from a high-tension tower, where the child climbed the tower by means of crossbeams and there was evidence that other children also climbed
the tower.
In the light of the above decisions, especially those of Belt
Railway Company v. Charters and Burns v. City of Chicago, is
not the principal case an extension of the doctrine, or at least a
7 321 IM. 341, 151 N. E. 886 (1926).
8 338 I1. 89, 169 N. E. 811 (1930).

9 342 IMi. 482, 174 N. E. 577 (1931).
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liberal application of it? In the principal case the facts are similar in several respects to those of Burns v. City of Chicago. In
each case, the pole was difficult to climb, a companion warned
the injured child, and it was in a spirit of bravado before a
companion that the injured child climbed the pole.
In Burns v. City of Chicago the court, supporting the directed
verdict for the defendant, stressed the fact that the pole was
difficult to climb, and on that ground distinguished the case of
Deming v. City of Chicago, saying that in the latter case the instrumentality in question was a tree with "conveniently accessible branches," and a boy seeing such "might reasonably be expected to give expression to his inward urge to climb."
In the principal case the court cited as sustaining its position
all of the cases mentioned above except Burns v. City of Chicago.
Looking at the facts in those cases, we find that in all of them
the dangerous instrumentality was fairly accessible, whereas in
the principal case the fact that the injured boy had to climb
about twelve feet without the aid of rungs and also that his companion tried to climb the pole but was unable to do so, showed
that it was very difficult to reach the dangerous instrumentality.
Burns v. City of Chicago was not mentioned in the opinion in
the principal case, but if it had been brought to the attention
of the court, it is difficult to see how the court could maintain its
position in the face of the decision in that case. In short, it
appears that the limitation on the application of the doctrine of
attractive nuisance as laid down by the court in Burns v. City of
Chicago has been disregarded in Uhls v. Old Ben Coal Corporation.
J. M. COUGHLAN
EFFECT OF CIVIL PRACTICE ACT ON RULE

TO ANSWER IN-

STANTER.-In the recent case of Phegley v. Kroger Grocery &
Baking Company,' the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth
District held that the Civil Practice Act has not changed the law
that under a rule to answer instanter, taken against a defendant
who is not in court, either personally or by another, and who
has no notice of the rule, the defendant has the whole of the
judicial day on which the rule is taken in which to plead, and a
default, entered prior to the close of such day, is premature.
The suit was begun in the City Court of Alton to recover
damages for injuries to the health of the plaintiff, alleged to have
1 281 Ill. App. 544 (1935).
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resulted from eating spoiled boiled ham purchased from the
defendant. Some eight days after the return day, the defendant
not having answered and the plaintiff having obtained the rule
to answer instanter, an order of default was entered immediately.
Defendant's motion to vacate and to be permitted to plead, filed
within thirty days of such order, was denied. Defendant presented affidavits of two lawyers to the effect that they were in
court when the order was rendered, and that they thereafter
transacted business with the court that same day, proving the
order was not the final business of the day.
In the instant case, the court compared the provisions for
default under the Practice Act of 1907,2 and under the new Civil
Practice Act, 8 and failed "to note any distinction."
The court cites as clearly establishing the rule under the old
practice, namely, that a rule to answer instanter requires a plea
"before the rising of the court," the following appellate court
decisions: Mercer v. Mercer,4 Risedorf v. Fyfe, A. W. Stevens
7
Company v. Kehr,6 and Northrop v. McGee.
However, even a cursory perusal of those decisions reveals
that they are either not exactly in point or do not sustain the
rule for which they are cited.
Mercer v. Mercer was a divorce case, in which defendant had
not only entered an appearance and waived process, but actually
consented to a default being entered.
In Risedorf v. Fyfe, a personal injury case in which defendant
had entered an appearance, defendant was held entitled to a motion to vacate because actual notice, as required by rules of court,
had not been given him.
In A. W. Stevens Company v. Kehr, the court, while recognizing the principle that upon a rule to plead instanter the defendant has until the rising of the court, nevertheless holds that if
default be taken sooner and defendant does not present a plea
before the rising of the court, the earlier default is not reversible
error.
In Northrop v. McGee, decided before the Act of 1907, the
court does recognize the rule contended for in the instant case,
but does not reverse, because defendant made no showing that
2

Section 57.

Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, par. 178.
4 271 Ill. App. 307 (1933).
5 250 Ill. App. 122 (1928).
6 93 Ill. App. 510 (1900).
T 20 Ill. App. 108 (1886).
3
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the default was not "entered at the last instant of the session."
It therefore appears that the principal case is perhaps at variance with the decisions under the old practice, and it is respect.
fully submitted that the rule enunciated in A. W. Stevens Company v. Kehr, holding that the entrance of judgment before the
end of the judicial day does not constitute reversible error unless
a plea is actually offered later in the day and refused, is the
better rule.
G. S. STANS
PLEDGE OF ASSETS BY BANKS TO SECURE DEPosrrs.-The Supreme Court of Illinois has held in the case of People ex rel.
Nelson v. Wiersema State Bank' that the pledge of assets by a
state bank to secure deposits is ultra vires and void, except where
there is a statutory grant of such power.
The receiver of the closed Wiersema State Bank filed a petition
in the Superior Court of Cook County to declare invalid a pledge
made by the bank of certain assets to secure the deposit of the
Fernwood Park District and for an order to return to petitioner
the securities deposited in escrow with the Chicago Title and
Trust Company. The trial court held the pledge ultra vires and
void, and ordered that the securities be returned to the petitioner. Both the Appellate and Supreme Courts upheld this
view.
The Supreme Court held that no legislation is necessary to
establish or preserve the state's sovereign right to a preference
in the distribution of the assets of a closed bank, inasmuch as this
right existed at common law, but that this preferential right does
not extend to any of the political subdivisions of the state.
The court referred to sections of four Illinois statutes containing provisions for the pledge of assets by banks to secure deposits
made by (1) receivers of closed banks, (2) the State Treasurer,
(3) other custodians of state funds, and (4) the Chicago Park
District. "The logical conclusion," the court said, "is, that if
the legislature had intended to extend those provisions to other
deposits it would have so provided .... The rule that the expres-

sion of one thing or one mode of action in an enactment excludes
any other, even though there be no negative words prohibiting it,
has been the settled law of this State since 1852."
The court stated that, if the power to pledge assets to secure
deposits exists, "it must be found by necessary implication, in
1 361 Ill. 75, rehearing denied October 2, 1935.
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the grant of power to do a general banking business." The decision on this point was that the power was not necessary to
deposit banking and was not included in the language granting
the power to do a "general banking business."
The position taken by the Illinois Supreme Court is not universally followed. The problem has often arisen where the bank
has deposited collateral with a surety to indemnify it against loss
on a bond executed by the bank to secure deposits of political
subdivisions of states. Three cases have upheld the pledge of
assets with a surety: (1) where a statute has declared that a
deposit of public funds is prima facie a trust fund, 2 (2) where a
statute has authorized the pledging of securities of a specified
class and the bank has in fact pledged bills receivable," and
(3) where a statute empowered trust companies to receive deposits of money and other personal property and issue their
obligations therefore.4 In the first two of these cases, it was declared, notwithstanding the statutes involved, that it was the
public policy of the state to discriminate in favor of public
funds.
In some cases, 5 it has been held that a bank has the right, even
in the absence of a statute, to pledge its assets to indemnify a
surety who signs a bond in its behalf in order that the bank may
obtain a deposit of public funds. These cases have often been
cited with approval in the decisions based on statutes.
The Illinois case of Ward v. Johnson,6 cited as support in
many cases holding contrary to the recent decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court, was not mentioned in that decision. The early
case involved a bank which was authorized by its charter "to
receive money on deposit and pay interest therefor."
In the
course of the opinion the court said:
"The corporation was authorized to contract and agree with
persons desiring to make deposits or loan money as to the terms.
It might execute its bond, note or certificate as evidence of the
indebtedness, and secure the same by pledge or chattel mortgage,
or note, securities, etc., or by real estate mortgage or trust deed,
just as should be mutually agreed. And there has been no reason
2 United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Village of Bassfield, 148
Miss. 109, 114 So. 26 (1927).
8 Melaven v. Hunker, 35 N. M. 427, 299 P. 1075 (1931).
4 Cameron v. Christy, 286 Pa. 405, 133 A. 551 (1926).
5 McFerson v. National Surety Co., 75 Colo. 482, 212 P. 489 (1927);
Ainsworth v. Kruger, 89 Mont. 468, 260 P. 1055 (1927).
6 95 Ill. 215 (1880).
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suggested, and we can conceive of none, why providing a system
for securing loans and deposits generally in a particular way is
objectionable, when it would not be objectionable to conduct a
single transaction in that way."
It would seem that the Supreme Court has made some departure from the doctrine of Ward v. Johnson. In the instant
case it has followed closely the reasoning of the Kentucky court
in the leading case on the subject, Commercial Bank & Trust
Company v. Citizens Trust & Guarantee Company,7 which holds
that where the power to pledge assets to secure deposits is not
expressly granted to a bank, it can be sustained only as an
implied power, such power being one necessary to carry out
powers expressly given; that such a power should be clearly
essential to the proper conduct of its business; and that when
such a test is applied to the claim of right, on the part of the
bank, to prefer one of its depositors over another, the right
should be denied. "The exercise of such a power," the Kentucky
court said, "would necessarily be fraught with great possibilities
for the perpetration of fraud, and would undoubtedly have a
tendency to destroy the faith of the depositing public in banking
institutions."
J. J. LANNON
VALIDITY OF CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO BENEFIClARIES'
EST IN A TESTAMENTARY TRUST.-A

INTER-

testator ordinarily may at-

tach to a legacy or devise made by him any condition, whether
sensible or not, so long as it is not illegal, nor opposed to public
policy. In In re Andru's Estate,1 the Surrogate Court of New
York was confronted with a novel set of facts limiting the beneficiaries' rights, and was called upon to decide whether or not
the conditions imposed contravened public policy.
The testator had settled two inter vivos trusts in addition to
two trusts created by the residuary clause of the will. The
trustees were all given a wide latitude of powers. It was provided that the trustees should have all powers that the settlor
would have in the management of his own property, and any
doubt as to their authority should be construed in favor of the
trustees. It was further provided in the will that all the beneficiaries must, in writing, when called upon by the trustees,
acquiesce in the administration of the trust, and ratify and con7

153 Ky. 566, 156 S. W. 160, 164 (1913).

1 281 N. Y. S. 831 (1935).
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firm all acts done by them or their successors. In the event of
failure of a beneficiary to comply with this condition, it was
stipulated that his interest should be forfeited. In commenting
on these provisions, the court said, "Pursuit of counsel has
failed to reveal in this country, or in England, a case containing
so drastic an in terrorem provision or one dealing with the administration of the estate."
The petitioner was a life beneficiary of the trusts and had a
remainder interest in the principal, subject to being divested, if
he should die before the termination of the trust. It was contended by the petitioner that such limitation on his interest in
the trust was void as against public policy and it was so held
by the court.
Generally, a condition in a will that a gift shall be forfeited in
case the beneficiary shall dispute the will, is regarded as valid
and not against public policy.2 This condition did not, however, pertain to the contesting of the validity of the will, but to
something extrinsic to it. The object of the provision was to
create an estate upon a condition subsequent, the operation of
which at some future time would cause the interest of the beneficiary to be divested. If the limitation were to be held valid, the
beneficiaries would be required to condone the dissipation of
assets, embezzlement, or even acquiesce in the embarkation of the
trustees upon an illegal enterprise.
The court pointed out that conditions subsequent are construed
with great strictness. The same idea was expressed by the
Supreme Court of Illinois in Dunne v. Minsor.5 "While conditions subsequent are not favored in the law, and courts are
inclined against them in case of doubt, yet, if the intention to
create such an estate is clear, and the restrictions are not opposed
to a settled rule of law or public policy, courts will give effect
to them." This being a condition subsequent, in that it provided for forfeiture of a vested interest by failure or refusal of
the beneficiaries to ratify or acquiesce in the acts of the trustees,
any doubt as to whether or not the limitation was in violation of
public policy should be construed in favor of the petitioner.
2 69 C. J. 1765; Rudd v. Searles, 262 Mass. 490, 160 N. E. 882 (1928);
Moran v. Moran, 144 Iowa 451, 123 N. W. 202 (1909); In re Brush's
Estate, 277 N. Y. S. 559, 154 Misc. 480 (1935) ; In re Miller, 156 Cal. 119,
103 P. 842 (1909).
Contra, In re Keenan's Will, 188 Wis. 163, 205 N. W. 1001 (1925);
Norwalk Trust v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168, 101 A. 961 (1918).
3 212 Ill. 333, 143 N. E. 842 (1924).
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On the matter of public policy, the Surrogate Court held that the
statutes enacted in New York to protect persons in the right and
administration of property were enacted from the viewpoint of
public interest, and therefore fell within public policy. The
Illinois Supreme Court, in Trip v. Payne,4 when called upon to
decide whether a provision in a will was void as against public
policy, said, "The public policy of the state is to be found embodied in its constitution, its statutes, and decisions of court."
From the parallel ideas as expressed by the two courts, it
would seem that if a similar set of facts should arise in Illinois,
the opinion of the Surrogate Court would be followed.
W. R. MAcMiuA
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE APPEAL FROM ORDER GRANTING
NEw TRLu.-Under the provisions of the Civil Practice Act 1

and the rules of the Appellate Court,2 an extension of time for
filing of records, abstracts and petition for appeal from an order
granting a new trial, must be granted within thirty days after
the entry of the order by the trial court, and the court has no
power to grant a further extension after the expiration of such
thirty day period, according to the opinion in the case of
Akehurst v. Summes by Justice Hugo Friend, in which the
eight other Justices of the Appellate Court of the First District
concurred.
This is the first time that the procedure to be followed in an
appeal from an order granting a new trial has ever been reviewed in Illinois. Consequently, the holding is of the utmost
importance.
In this case, an order granting a new trial to the defendant
was entered June 20, 1935. On July 19, 1935, twenty-nine days
after the entry of the order, the Appellate Court extended, for
a period of thirty days, the time within which plaintiff might
file a record, abstract, and petition for leave to appeal. Thereafter, on August 16, 1935, plaintiff moved for further extension
of sixty days to file her record, abstracts, and petition.
In consideration of the problem thus squarely put to them, the
court said, first, that the right of appeal is purely statutory;'
4

339 Ill. 178, 171 N. E. 131 (1930).

1 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, par. 205.
2

Rules of the Appellate Court, 1st Dist., Rule 20.

3 281 Ill. App. 554 (1935).
4 Bondurant v. Bondurant, 251 Ill. 324, 96 N. E. 306 (1911).
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second, that until the Civil Practice Act, no right to appeal
from an order granting a new trial was given to litigants, but,
third, that under the Civil Practice Act an order granting a
new trial is now deemed to be final, 5 and upon leave granted by
the reviewing court, such appeal may be taken. 6
The court then found that the Civil Practice Act makes no
provision for extending the time to file the record, abstract, and
petition but that the rules of court do so provide.7
This, of course, is clear upon a reading of the rule, but the
extension of time to be allowed under the rule must be granted
within the time allowed for moving the court for leave to appeal.
Under no possible construction of the rule referred to, can any
other decision be reached. The rule does not contemplate any
further extensions of time, and the court draws the analogy to
the statutory appeal granted from interlocutory orders,8 reasoning that it was contemplated by the legislature and by the court
that the utmost speed was the essence of such an appeal.
The court then refers to the similar situation which in the past
existed in the preparation of record for a review of fourth class
cases under the Municipal Court Act.9 This Act authorized an
appeal within thirty days after the entry of any final order or
judgment and provided that the judge by whom such final
order or judgment was entered was to sign and place on file in
the case a statement of the facts appearing upon the trial or a
correct stenographic report of the proceedings.
This statute was considered and discussed in the case of
Lassers v. North GermanLloyd Steam Ship Company.10 In that
case, defendants sued out a writ of error to review a judgment
entered in the Municipal Court in a fourth class case on June
5, 1909. On July 1, 1909, the court extended the time for filing
a bill of exceptions to July 15. On July 14, a second extension
was granted for an additional ten days, and on July 21 the bill
of exceptions was filed. The Appellate Court struck the bill of
exceptions on plaintiff's motion, because it was not filed within
the time allowed by the statute and granted a certificate of importance to the Supreme Court.
5 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, par. 205, the statute reads:
.. an order granting a new trial shall be deemed to be a final order
6 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, par. 205.
7 Rules of the Appellate Court, 1st Dist., Rule 20.
8 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, par. 206.
9 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1931), Ch. 37, par. 411.
10 244 Ill. 570, 91 N. E. 676 (1910).
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The Supreme Court in passing on the question stated that
since the statement in this case was not signed or filed within any
extension of time allowed by the court within thirty days of the
entry of the final judgment, the Appellate Court's decision was
correct. The court further states that there is no basis in the
statute for the claim that having extended the time within the
thirty days provided by statute, the court might, within the
extended period, again extend the time; that the statute must be
strictly complied with; and that the practice in the circuit court,
in reference to signing of bills of exceptions and extensions of
time therefor, was not in point.
In the matter of Wurlitzer Company v. Dickinson,1 the same
question was raised, and the same decision given.
The court in the instant case concludes that the right to appeal
from an order granting a new trial is not a privilege heretofore
given litigants, and should be promptly exercised. Accordingly,
not having followed the statute and rules12 to the letter, a motion
for a further extension should be denied.
In so holding, the court has given a strict interpretation to
the rules of practice and procedure on appeal as it had previously done in the case of The West Side Trust and Savings Bank
v. Damond.13 In answer to criticism which might be raised because of this strict interpretation of the rules, apparently in
conflict with the general liberal ideas and interpretations to be
applied to the Civil Practice Act, it may be said that in so deciding, the court is following the intention of the Practice Act,
which is designed for speed and not delay; that by holding litigants strictly to the rules of procedure, especially on appeal,
it is forwarding its purpose. While a liberal construction may be
given to the rules regarding pleadings so as not to defeat a cause
of action on technicalities, the same argument cannot apply with
equal force to procedure on appeal.
J. E. BRUNSWICK
DIRECTED VERDICT AND JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT

UNDER CIVIL PRACTICE ACT.-In two late cases the Illinois Appel-

late Court has supplemented its earlier interpretation of section
68, paragraph 3a of the Civil Practice Act.' The section pro11 247 Ill. 27, 93 N. E. 132 (1910).

12 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, par. 205, Rules of the Appellate
Court, 1st Dist., Rule 20.
13 280 Ill. App. 343 (1935) ; see 13 CHICAGO-KENT REvIEW 297.
1 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, par. 196.
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vides that at the close of the testimony either party may move
for a directed verdict and that the court may reserve its decision
on the motion until after verdict, when, if it decides as a matter
of law that the party requesting the directed verdict was entitled
thereto, it may order judgment in accordance with its decision,
notwithstanding the verdict.
In Herbst v. Levy, 2 the decision was that the discretion allowed
the court in reserving its decision is not accorded where defendant makes the motion before he has introduced any evidence, i. e.,
where plaintiff has failed to prove his case. 3 But in Illinois
Tuberculosis Association v. Springfield Marine Bank,4 and in
Capele v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company,5 the court
reserved its decision on defendant's motion, made at the close
of defendant's case, for directed verdict, until after verdict was
rendered.
In the Capelle case the lower court gave judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict, and was reversed because it
had so decided by weighing the evidence. In the Bank case the
lower court followed the Capelle decision and refused the motion
because to allow it would require the court to determine a question of fact by weighing the evidence. This decision was affirmed on appeal.
The appellate court explained the change wrought by the new
act, as follows: "At common law, a judgment non obstante
veredicto could only be entered when the plea confessed the cause
of action and set up matters in avoidance . . . which were, even
if true, immaterial and did not constitute a defense to the action.
It was a judgment for the plaintiff on the pleadings because
the pleas of defendant did not present a defense. It was only
rendered on the application of the plaintiff, and was never allowed on motion of the defendant."
After observing that the motion is now available to either
party, the opinion proceeded: "The court in passing on the
motion must decide as a matter of law, that the party requesting
the directed verdict is entitled thereto. This provision of the
Civil Practice Act taken in connection with Rule 22 of the Rules
of Practice of the Supreme Court, which provides: 'The power
of the court to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
2
3
4
5

279
See
282
280

Ill.
App. 353 (1935).
note, 13 CHICAGo-KENT REvIEw 260.
I1. App. 14 (1935).
Ill.
App. 471 (1935).

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

may be exercised in all cases where, under the evidence of the
case, it would have been the duty of the court to direct a verdict
without submitting the case to the jury,' requires the court to
be governed by the same rules in passing upon a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict as govern it in passing
upon a motion for a directed verdict. The trial court in passing
upon this motion has no more authority to weigh and determine
controverted questions of fact under the Civil Practice Act than
under the Practice Act of 1907."
The three decisions indicate the limits of the new section.
First, defendant is still entitled to a directed verdict at once
when plaintiff, at the close of his evidence, has not proved a
prima facie case; second, after all the evidence is in, the court
may reserve its decision on motion by either party for a directed
verdict, until the verdict is rendered; third, after verdict, either
on a previous motion for a directed verdict, or on motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, made by either party, the
court may order judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but only
when the case presented by the party favored by the verdict,
regarded in its most favorable light, does not, as a matter of
law, entitle him to judgment.
C. E. Fox, JR.
SURETY AS CREDITOR OF His INSOLVENT

PRINCIPAL AND

EN-

TITLED TO CLAIM WHICH HE CAN SET OFF AGAINST DEBT HE

OWES PRINCIPAL.-In

O'Connell v. Nelson,1 the Appellate Court

of Illinois remarked that neither the Supreme nor Appellate
Court had passed on the principle of law it was then considering, and that the supreme courts of other states were in hopeless conflict in regard to it.
The facts were that Nelson was indebted to the Aledo State
Bank on judgment notes and was also one of the sureties on a
depository bond with the bank as principal, both notes and bond
having been executed prior to the bank's insolvency. After the
receiver was appointed, a judgment was first obtained against
Nelson on the bond, and then on his notes. Thereafter Nelson
paid the judgment on the bond. The receiver, unable to collect
the judgment he had obtained against Nelson at law, brought
a creditor's bill to set aside a conveyance Nelson had made previous to the rendition of the judgment. Nelson, denying that
the conveyance was fraudulent, counterelaimed by way of set1 281

Ill.
App. 327 (1935).
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off the amount he had paid as surety after the bank's insolvency;
and the court allowed the set-off on the pleadings.
The courts denying a set-off under these circumstances do so
on the ground that a surety has no claim against his principal
on which a set-off can be founded until he pays the obligation;
and, since choses in action pass to a receiver subject to the right
of set-off existing at the moment of insolvency, payment after
insolvency gives him only a claim which will be paid out of the
assets of the bank in due course of administration-assets which
will be augmented by the satisfaction of his debt to the insolvent,
rather than diminished by allowing a set-off amounting in effect
2
to a preference.
Obviously, to be allowed a set-off in the present case, Nelson
must have had a claim as a creditor of the bank before he paid
the judgment rendered against him on the bond, since the Illinois
law is that the rights and liabilities of creditors and debtors of
an insolvent are fixed and determined at the time of the appointment of a receiver ;3 and that equities thereafter created are not
available as against the receiver.
The significance of the decision in O'Connell v. Nelson lies in
the holding that a surety does have a claim against his principal
the moment the principal becomes insolvent-a claim founded
not on the fact of payment, but on the fact of default, since when
that occurs the liability of the surety becomes absolute.
In reaching this conclusion, the court had no Illinois cases
based on the same factual situation to guide it,4 but found the
important premise involved in several decisions. These held that
when a surety signs a bond the law raises an implied promise by
the principal to reimburse the surety for any loss which he may
sustain, and that when a loss occurs, this implied contract of
indemnity relates back and takes effect from the time the surety
2 Gilbertson v. Northern Trust Co., 53 N. D. 502, 207 N. W. 42 (1925) ;
U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wooldridge, 268 U. S. 234, 69 L. Ed. 932,
40 A. L. R. 1094 (1924) ; U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Maxwell, 152
Ark. 64, 237 S. W. 708 (1922) ; Viegel v. Converse, 168 Minn. 408, 210 N.

W. 162 (1926).
3 Hynes v. Ill. Trust & Savings Bank, 226 Ill.
95, 80 N. E. 753 (1907).
4 But see Mack v. Woodruff, 87 Ill.
570 (1877), where in a dissenting
opinion Sheldon, J.,says, "As the payment by the surety of his principal's
debt was a compulsory one, by force of the obligation of suretyship contracted in the lifetime of the principal, I think, as respects this question of
set-off, the payments by the surety should be taken to relate back to the time
his liability as surety was contracted, and be regarded, for the purpose of
set-off, the same as if they had been made in the lifetime of the principal."
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became responsible ;5 and that the relation of debtor and creditor
between principal and surety commences at the date of the
obligation by which the surety becomes bound and not from the
time it makes payment.6 These principles have support in other
jurisdictions. However, the real test of the surety's status as a
creditor by virtue of the implied contract of indemnity arises
when he contends that he had the right of set-off against his
principal the moment the latter's insolvency made him absolutely
liable, and that hence he has the same right against the principal's assignee. Under this reasoning, the date the surety makes
payment on his surety obligation becomes immaterial.
If the claim against the principal, which is alleged to exist
at the moment of insolvency, cannot rest on the right of exoneration arising out of the implied contract to be indemnified, it
will fail, since as subrogee the surety has no claim until payment.
Apparently the appellate court felt that if in Illinois a surety
can have affirmative relief against a defaulting principal so as
to avoid a conveyance made by the principal several years after
the surety has paid, 8 and so as to call in question a deed executed
by the principal before the surety's obligation was absolute, 9
a surety who is a creditor of his principal for such purposes
should be allowed the defense of set-off on the same reasoning.
That is, it being established that the relationship between principal and surety is that of debtor and creditor as of the date of
the suretyship, by virtue of the implied contract of indemnity,
the surety's contingent claim to be reimbursed ripens into an
absolute one the moment the principal defaults by becoming insolvent, and this claim will support the right of set-off.
By finding the right of set-off to exist at the moment of insolvency, the court disposes of the charge of a preference, holding that by closing its doors a bank is equitably owed only the
balance over and above the amount it owes the debtor; it is
this debt which passes to the receiver and the allowance of the
set-off does not amount to a preference.
5 Estate of Ramsay v. Whitbeck, 183 Ill. 550, 56 N. E. 322 (1900).
6 Choteau v. Jones, 11 Ill. 300 (1849).
7 Rice v. Southgate, 82 Mass. 16 (1860) ; Barney v. Grover, 28 Vt. 391
(1856) ; McDonald v. Mueller, 123 Ark. 226, 183 S. W. 751 (1916) ; State
v. Bank of Magdalena, 33 N. M. 473, 270 P. 881 (1928); Md. Casualty Co.
v. Hjorth, 187 Wis. 270, 202 N. W. 665 (1925); Leach v. Bassman, 208
Iowa 1374, 227 N. W. 339 (1929) ; Williams v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 236 U. S. 549, 59 L. Ed. 717 (1915).
8 Choteau v. Jones, 11 Ill. 300 (1849).
9 Hatfield v. Merod, 82 Ill. 113 (1876).

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

There is more logic and greater equity in distinguishing, as
the Illinois court does, between indemnity and subrogation, because, as the Wisconsin court reasoned in a similar case, the allowance of a set-off of an unpaid but absolute obligation at the
time of insolvency shows no greater favor to a surety than is
shown a depositor who is allowed to set off his deposit against
his debt to an insolvent bank. 10
The courts which support this reasoning feel that all depositors
derive a greater benefit, because of the relations between the
surety and the bank, though set-off be allowed, than they would
were those relations absent. The basis is the same in all of the
cases, that is, the implied contract of indemnity."
It has been held that the right to set off against the principal
or his assignee, a suretyship obligation in advance of payment,
exists only in favor of a sole surety. 12 In the present case Nelson
was not a sole surety on the depository bond but, presumably,
he was the only solvent one when the principal defaulted.
KATHERINE

REAL ESTATE VALUATION

H.

FOR TAXATION

JOHNSON

PURPosEs.-An un-

usual proposition regarding valuation of real estate for tax purposes was presented in the case of The People ex rel. Joseph B.
MeDonough, County Collector, Appellee, v. The Chicago Union
Lime Company, Appellant.' The appellant, hereafter referred
to as the Lime Company, was the owner of an exhausted stone
quarry, abandoned for quarrying purposes, the fair cash market
value of which as real estate, excluding the business income from
the property as an element, they contended was $12,800. The
quarry, however, was actually in use as a dumping ground for
hire. The assessor had previously fixed the assessed valuation at
10 City of Rice Lake v. Citizens' State Bank of Rice Lake, 204 Wis. 228,
235 N. W. 398 (1931).
11 U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Ryan, 124 Wash. 329, 214 P. 433,
39 A. L. R. 109 (1923) ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Duke, 293 F. 661
(1923) ; Kilby v. First Nat'l Bank, 66 N. Y. S. 579 (1900); Chenault v.
Bush, 84 Ky. 528, 2 S. W. 160 (1886) ; St. Paul & M. Trust Co. v. Leck,
58 N. W. 826 (Minn., 1894) ; Craighead v. Swartz, 219 Pa. 149, 67 A. 1003
(1907) ; Momsen v. Noyes, 105 Wis. 565, 81 N. W. 860 (1900) ; Scott v.
Armstrong, 146 U. S. 510, 36 L. Ed. 499 (1892) ; Barnes v. Barnes, 106 Va.
319, 56 S. E. 172 (1907) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 83 W. Va. 593, 98 S. E. 812
(1919) ; dissenting opinion in U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wooldridge,
268 U. S. 234, 69 L. Ed. 932, 40 A. L. R. 1094 (1924).
12 Merwin v. Austin, 58 Conn. 22, 18 A. 1029, 7 L. R. A. 84 (1889).
1 361 Ill. 304, 198 N. E. 1 (1935).
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$359,000, which had been reduced by the Board of Review to the
sum of $215,526.
The witnesses for the collector arrived at the market value
through an estimate of its income capacity as a dumping ground
over a twenty-year period. They produced evidence that in 1929,
52,628, and in 1930, 76,485 cubic yards had been dumped on the
property, and that the usual dumping charge was about 30c per
cubic yard. After making deductions for salaries, maintenance,
taxes, etc., and providing for a sinking fund to reimburse the
depletion in capital value, the fair cash market value of the
property was arrived at by capitalizing the resulting annual net
income, and thereby placed at $225,000.
The real question of law before the court was "whether or not
the valuation and assessment were so excessive and illegal as to
constitute a legal fraud." In arriving at its conclusion that it
did not, the court mentioned the general principles that in fixing
the value of property, the presumption is that the taxing authorities had properly discharged their duties, that the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence a fraudulent overvaluation is on the objector, and that it is not sufficient to prove
a mere overvaluation, but that the evidence must establish that
such excess valuation is the result of some improper, corrupt, or
illegal motive on the part of the assessing authorities, or is so
grossly excessive as to constitute constructive fraud. If one considers the fact that the collector had put in evidence that in
previous years the Lime Company's appraisers had arrived at
valuations of from approximately $152,000 to $158,000, by a
similar process, and that, therefore, the objector had not satisfactorily met the burden placed on him of establishing fraud,
actual or constructive, the decision is legally sound.
However, the decision is apt to be erroneously interpreted as
sustaining the method of valuation used. The generally accepted
standard for tax valuation of real estate is its present actual or
market value. 2 Where the property, as in the instant case, is
unique, the assessor is allowed to take into consideration all facts
directly affecting the value, including advantages of location and
2 For average property the definition that: "Ordinarily 'market value'
means a price fixed by sales in the way of ordinary business by willing sellers
to willing and able purchasers and is established when other property of the
same kind has been bought and sold without restraint or compulsion in so
many instances that a value may reasonably be inferred," enunciated in
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. City of Hartford, 99 Conn. 329, 122 A. 91
(1923), is commonly used.
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use. There is some conflict as to the extent prospective value may
be considered, but even in the more liberal view, it cannot be
made the substantive basis of assessment, but can only be considered as an element that enters into or is reflected by present
value. 8
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Orr voices his objection to
the method used in that it "may be found a dangerous precedent
in valuing property for ad valorem taxation." He pointed out
that the valuation is based solely on an estimate of the property's
income capacity over a twenty-year period, only two of which
are past years, while the others are in the future, and therefore
entirely speculative, and that to that extent it goes too far. The
suggestion was made that an adjacent quarry might be used
for a swimming pool, or that the one in question might be operated by a tenant (there apparently being no contract for the
period mentioned), and by the use of a similar process of
valuation, inequalities would necessarily arise.
The majority opinion cites the early supreme court case of
The State of Illinois v. The Illinois Central Railroad,4 as supporting the proposition that the income capacity is a proper
factor to be considered in real estate valuation for tax purposes.
In that case, the State, in effect, urged that although the railroad
company was not then making money, the prospective increased
earnings for the future should be taken into consideration and
given effect by a correspondingly increased value at the then
present time. As to this the court said: "It was urged on
the argument by the counsel for the State, that the prospective
value of the road should be taken into the estimate, and not its
income. Such value is purely speculative, it must be admitted,
and we very much question if it is a proper element in the
present case or any like case. The assessment is for the time being only, and the value of the property for such purposes should
be limited to that time, the more especially as in the efflux of
time, other valuations are required to be made."
The argument might be made that in the Lime Stone Company case, the valuation did not take into account future speculative values, but attempted only to find the present value by
taking into account future income. In effect, however, is this not
a mere play on words, and is not, in reality, prospective future
income being considered? It should be noted that the "prospec8 See annotation, 24 A. L. R. 644 (1922).
4

27 Ill. 64 (1861).
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tive value" mentioned in the earlier opinion referred to the
State's attempt to show prospective increased future income
merely as an element to be used in the proof of present income,
and not as the sole and entire basis. When thus analyzed, it
would seem that the early case, taken as a whole, strongly disapproves of the method of valuation used in the instant case. It is
proper, however, to observe that the method of ascertaining the
market value was not directly attacked by the objectors, and that
if it had been, it does not follow that the method used therein
would have been approved.
C. E. HACKLANDER
PREFERENCES UNDER

THE BANK

COLLECTION

CoDE.-Whether

or not a certified check, cashier's check, or bank draft, should be
allowed as a preferred claim against an insolvent Illinois bank,
has been a question of great uncertainty in the minds not only
of lawyers, but of courts as well. When the Bank Collection
Code was adopted in Illinois,' it was thought by many that the
problem had been clarified, but that such was not the case is
now recognized, and is aptly illustrated by the diverse views
of two recent opinions handed down almost simultaneously by
the appellate court of Illinois.
In the case of People ex rel. Nelson v. Farmersand Merchants
Bank,2 an individual who had a certificate of deposit of a bank,
cashed it and purchased a draft payable to himself, indorsed the
draft in blank, and delivered it to a third party, who presented it
for payment the following day. Payment was refused because
the bank had closed; the draft being subsequently returned to
him, he filed a claim with the receiver and it was allowed as a
general claim and approved by the court. Later he asked that
the judgment be opened up and the claim allowed as a preferred
one. The court refused the request on the ground that the matter
had already been adjudicated, but stated that if the depositor
had originally asked for a preferred claim, he would have been
entitled to one. The statement, it is true, is dictum, but the
matter of preference was before the court, and the statement was
made with all the essential facts before it.
In the case of People ex rel. Edward J. Barrett v. First State
Bank and Trust Company of Canton,3 a bank received and paid
1 The Bank Collection Code became effective in Illinois on July 8, 1931.
It is covered in Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 98, par. 219-233.
2 281 Ill. App. 354 (1935).
3 281 Ill. App. 320 (1935).
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in full a check drawn by an individual on another bank in the
same city. On the same day it took the check to the drawee
bank for payment, and accepted the cashier's check of the drawee
bank. Before the cashier's check was cashed, the drawee bank
closed and never reopened. The court refused to allow the resulting claim as a preferred one on the basis that the cashier's
check wasan "unconditional credit" upon the books of the
drawee bank, which gave rise to the relationship of debtor and
creditor, and was clearly within the exceptions of Section 13,
4
Paragraph 2 of the Bank Collection Code.
The question of preferences under the Collection Code has
been before the Illinois courts on several occasions. In the supreme court case of McQueen v. Randall,5 the court allowed a
preference on a claim where a depositor of a bank drew a check,
had it certified, and after the bank closed, presented it for payment to the receiver. The Illinois appellate court in People ex rel.
Nelson v. Joliet Trust and Savings Bank, 6 held that where one
who has certificates of deposit cashes them at the bank, and the
bank issues its draft drawn on another bank which refuses to
honor the draft because the drawer bank had closed in the meantime, the legal holder of the draft was entitled to a preference.
4 The material part of the paragraph follows: ". . . when a drawee or
payor bank has presented to it for payment an item or items drawn upon or
payable by or at such bank and at the time has on deposit to the credit of
the maker or drawer an amount equal to such item or items and such
drawee or payor shall fail or close for business as above, after having
charged such item or items to the account of the maker or drawer thereof
or otherwise discharged his liability thereon but without such item or items
having been paid or settled for by the drawee or payor either in money or by
an unconditional credit given on its books or on the books of any other bank,
which has been requested or accepted so as to constitute such drawee or
payor or other bank debtor therefor, the assets of such drawee or payor shall
be impressed with a trust in favor of the owner or owners of such item or
items for the amount thereof, or for the balance payable upon a number of
items which have been exchanged, and such owner or owners shall be entitled to a preferred claim upon such assets, irrespective of whether the fund
representing such item or items can be traced and identified as part of such
assets or has been intermingled with or converted into other assets of such
failed bank."
5 353 Ill. 231, 187 N. E. 286 (1933). The case is criticized in 32 Mich. L.
Rev. 996, and in 29 Ill. L. Rev. 891. Contra, Suburban Const. Co. v. Page,
162 Md. 355, 159 A. 777 (1932); State ex rel. Sorensen v. State Bank of
Omaha, 257 N. W. 527 (Neb., 1934); Downey v. Citizen's State Bank of
Noblesville, 194 N. E. 743 (Ind., 1935) ; Fulton v. Schuky, 128 Ohio St. 147,
191 N. E. 3 (1934).
6 273 Ill. App. 138 (1933).
This case was also criticized in 29 Ill. L.
Rev. 891. Contra, Fulton, Supt. of Banks v. Rundell, 128 Ohio St. 205,
190 N. E. 457 (1934), the court saying that the act was in derogation of
the common law and must be strictly construed.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

Again the Supreme Court, in the case of People ex rel. Nelson
v. E. C. Dennhardt,7 allowed a preference where a township
treasurer drew a check against his deposit in the bank and presented it for payment. Instead of paying the check as requested,
the payor bank issued its draft payable to the depositor in his
official capacity, the bank charging the depositor's account for
the amount of the draft. The draft was then deposited in another bank, but the drawer bank closed before it was collected.
In each of the cases mentioned the claimant relied on Section
13, Paragraph 2 of the Collection Code for a preference. A
careful reading of the section will show that in order to qualify
for a preference thereunder, there must be: an item payable by
or at the bank involved; a presentment to the bank for payment;
sufficient funds on deposit by the maker or drawer; a charging
to the account of the maker or drawer by the bank before it is
closed; and a failure of the bank to pay the item by cash or
unconditional credit, which has been requested or accepted.
From a careful analysis of the facts involved in the individual
cases mentioned, it becomes obvious that with the possible exception of the Dennhardt case, 8 they do not come within the purpose
or provisions of the act, and the claimants were entitled to no
preference thereunder. The appellate court's decision in People
v. First State Bank and Trust Company of Canton is not only
in accord with the purpose and provisions of the act but has the
support of decisions in other jurisdictions. 9
C. E. HACKLANDER
RIGHT OF JUDGMENT CREDITOR OF HEIR TO CONTEST WmL.-In
the recent case of In re Van Doren's Estate1 the Prerogative
Court of New Jersey held that a judgment creditor of one who
would inherit in the event of intestacy has a right to caveat the
probate of a will which would prevent property from descending
to such heir and becoming subject to the lien of the judgment.
Apparently, no Illinois reviewing court has ever decided whether
7 354 Ill. 450, 188 N. E. 464 (1933). Contra, Ex parte Sanders, 168 S. C
323, 167 S. E. 154 (1932) ; Fulton v. B. R. Baker-Toledo Co., 128 Ohio St.

226, 190 N. E. 459 (1934).

8 The case can be justified by adopting the view that by taking the draft,
it had not "accepted" an "unconditional credit."
9 The following case is cited and followed: South Carolina State Bank
v. Citizen's Bank, 173 S. C. 496, 176 S. E. 346 (1934). The same result is
reached in the following cases: In re Bank of United States, 243 App. Div.
287, 277 N. Y. S. 96 (1935) ; Lindsay v. Elliott et al., 77 F. (2d) 95 (1935).
1 180 A. 841 N. J., 1935).
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or not such a creditor is a party interested in the probate of a
will, as a search of the Illinois cases reveals no adjudication on
this question.
The succinct reasoning of the New Jersey court is as follows:
"Title to real estate vests in the heir at law immediately upon
the death of the ancestor, and at the same instant the lien of a
judgment against such heir attaches to his interest in the land.
If, subsequently, a valid will is probated, title may go in another
direction and the apparent lien of the judgment be defeated;
and although it is true that the will relates back and takes effect
as of the date of death, yet it must be remembered that it is
necessary to probate that will in order to divest the apparent
lien of the judgment. Obviously, it cannot be said that the
judgment creditor would not be injured by the probate of such
a will." Similar reasoning
is used by the courts of Minnesota,
2
Missouri, and Ohio.
A distinction should be made at the outset between the rights
of judgment creditors having a lien upon the debtors' realty, and
general creditors. Courts generally hold that a general creditor
3
is not a person interested in the probate of a will.
4
In the Alabama case of Lockard v. Stephenson judgment creditors of an heir, with liens, were seeking to contest the will which
disinherited their debtor. In denying relief, the court argued
that there was not the semblance of privity between the testatrix
and the creditors, that she could dispose of her property as she
chose, that what the heir had was only an expectancy, and that
the expectancy could not be made subject to the satisfaction of
the creditor's demands. In the view of the writer, what the
court said was true, but irrelevant to the issue. As to what interest the heir has before the testator's death, all will agree
that it is a mere expectancy, but that is immaterial when the
creditor is seeking to attach his lien to the interest the heir has
2 In re Langevin's Will, 45 Minn. 429, 47 N. W. 1133 (1891); Watson v.
Alderson, 146 Mo. 333, 48 S. W. 478 (1898); Bloor v. Platt, 78 Ohio St.
46, 84 N. E. 604 (1908).
3 Smith v. Bradstreet, 16 Pick. 264 (Mass., 1834) ; In re Langevin's Will,
45 Minn. 429, 47 N. W. 1133 (1891) ; Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 333,
48 S. W. 478 (1898) ; Lee v. Keech, 151 Md. 34, 133 A. 835, 46 A. L. R.
1488 (1926).
4 120 Ala. 641, 24 So. 996 (1899).
This case followed rather strictly as
authority the case of In re Shepard's Estate, 170 Pa. 323, 32 A. 1040 (1895),
where the Pennsylvania court made no distinction between judgment creditors and general creditors and mentioned nowhere that the contestants were
judgment creditors, although this was stated in the opinion of the lower
court, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 133.
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after the testator's death where the will is invalid. As the
Missouri' court said in Watson v. Alderson,5 "A lien creditor,
whose lien attaches the moment that title is vested in his debtor
by descent cast, although by virtue of his lien judgment he had
no interest in the estate of the deceased, has the same direct and
immediate interest in the probate of a will by which that title
would be divested that an heir at law has. It is not interest in
the estate of the deceased that authorized any person to contest
a will under the statute, but interest in its devolution,-in the
probate of the will that determines that devolution."
The case of Lockard v. Stephenson further maintained that the
failure or refusal of the heir to contest the will could not subrogate his judgment creditors to that right. A similar argument
was used in Bank of Tennessee v. Nelson, where the Tennessee
court said: "If he [the heir] acquiesces in its [the will's] validity by waiving his right to object and contest it . . . how can
his creditor, who has to pass through him, to reach the property,
make the objection for him?" However, in the case of In re
Langevin's Wil 7 it was said: "This right [of a judgment creditor] to resist the probate is not materially different in principle
from that of a judgment creditor to assail a prior, forged, or
fraudulent deed, apparently conveying the lands of the judgment debtor."
The doctrine of binding the creditor by the failure of the heir
to contest the will would be a safeguard for such a fraud as that
involved in Brooks v. Paine'sExecutors.8 There, according to the
bill of the creditors, some of whom had reduced their claims to
judgment and levied execution on the debtor's interest in his
deceased father's estate, the heir had connived with others or,
by his own act, had a spurious will presented for probate, or had
acquiesced in the probate of such. On an appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the bill, the court said: "If the
heir is insolvent, and is attempting to have or suffer his property
disposed of to his children or others, so that his creditors will be
defeated, it is a fraud upon the creditors which they are entitled to resist in the only forum and proceeding where resistance
would avail them any good. They are 'interested in the probate'
in the language of the statute."
5 146 Mo. 333, 48 S. W. 478 (1898).
6 3 Head (40 Tenn.) 634 (1859).
7 45 Minn. 429, 47 N. W. 1133 (1891).
8 123 Ky. 271, 90 S. W. 600 (1906).
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In Lee v. Keech 9 it was said that the interest in a debtor's
property necessary to support a caveat must be "such an interest gained in the property as will give the creditor a part of the
sum total rights of ownership." The interest of a judgment
creditor with statutory lien, the court said, was not such an
interest. Statements from Freeman on Judgment 10 were quoted
declaring that a judgment lien on land constitutes no right in
the land itself but confers only a right to levy on it. Statements
from the same work indicate, however, that statutes creating
judgment liens abrogate the necessity of levying execution, while
preserving a lien equivalent to a lien of execution, except where
a prior levy may create a priority of lien."'
The court, moreover, distinguished the case before it from
cases where the judgment creditor had levied on the interest of
the heir before probate, as in Smith v. Bradstreet,12 Bloor v.
3
Platt,"
and Watson v. Alderson,14 cases reaching the same result
as that in the instant case. Most courts, however, irrespective
of the side taken, consider as one the judgment creditor with
mere statutory lien and the judgment creditor who has levied
on the interest of the debtor.
J. J. LANNON
CIVIL

PRACTICE ACT

HELD

APPLICABLE IN CHICAGO MUNICIPAL

RULES.-In Ratner et
al. v. Bartholomee,' recently decided, the Illinois Appellate Court
sustained the Municipal Court of Chicago in holding that the
provisions of the Civil Practice Act are applicable in the municipal court unless inconsistent with express rules of that court.
COURT WHEN NOT INCONSISTENT WITH ITS

9 151 Md. 34, 133 A. 835, 46 A. L. R. 1488 (1926).
10 2 Freeman on Judgments, sec. 915.

11 "But it is to be noted that while dependent on the right to execution,
the actual issuance or levy of an execution is not essential to the existence of
a judgment lien as distinguished from the lien of the execution itself, though
a prior levy may result in a priority. Statutes may, however, require the
issuance of execution within a specified time in order that the lien may be
good as to intervening purchasers or encumbrancers, or may terminate the
lien if no execution has issued within a prescribed period. And the fact that
the statutory period of the life of the lien has expired does not prevent the
enforcement of the judgment by execution if it is not dormant." 2 Freeman
on Judgments, sec. 930.
12 16 Pick. 264 (Mass., 1834).
18 78 Ohio St. 46, 84 N. E. 604 (1908).
14 146 Mo. 333, 48 S. W. 478 (1898).
1 282 Ill. App. 298 (1935).
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Plaintiffs, who had previously represented defendant as her
attorneys in a divorce action in which she had been awarded
attorneys' fees, brought suit in the municipal court for fees.
Plaintiffs set out these facts, filed an affidavit conforming to
the requirements of section 57 of the Civil Practice Act,2 and
moved for summary judgment as allowed by that section.
Defendant contested the jurisdiction of the municipal court
to award summary judgment, and filed an affidavit of defense
setting out facts supporting her averment that plaintiffs had
not represented her with proper skill and care, and denying any
indebtedness. The municipal court granted plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment.
The appellate court held that defendant's affidavit "raised an
issue of fact which, under section 57 of the Civil Practice Act,
required the cause to be submitted to the jury." It therefore reversed the judgment. In so doing, however, the court observed:
"The questionof whether the municipal court is authorized to
make use of the summary judgment method prescribed by the
Civil Practice Act is not ... a question of jurisdiction, but one
of practice. The use of the method is not expressly forbidden
by the Municipal Court Act, nor forbidden by or inconsistent
with any of the rules adopted by the judges of the court. Such
use therefore is subject to review only in ease it has resulted
in an unjust judgment."
The decision thus definitely approves of rule 308 of the Municipal Court Rules, which expressly declares that the Civil
Practice Act provisions are applicable in that court, unless inconsistent or in conflict with the court's own rules.
C. E. Fox, JR.
2 Ill.

State Bar. Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, par. 185.

